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ABSTRACT

Henri Tajfel's theory on intergroup relations is used as a model for thinking about men and women on a group level and discussing the differences between intergroup and interpersonal behavior to integrate the study of the individual within the larger social system. Strategies are described to help women challenge the imbalance of power between the sexes and achieve a positive social identity. Recommendations for further research are included, along with the idea that women must reject their position as an inferior biological group and begin to offer their own interpretations of reality. (JAC)

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Women and Men: An Intergroup Analysis

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## INTRODUCTION

Most recent theory and research done on the psychology of women's lives has focused on the individual as the level of analysis. This perspective, while necessary, needs to be complemented by an analysis conducted on the group level.

It is a fact of social reality that people are categorized by sex into two groups. In comparing these two groups as they stand in relation to each other, it is women as a group who lack power, ~~status~~ and prestige. Many of the psychological experiences of the individual woman, including her conception of her own identity as well as her interactions with both women and men, are profoundly affected by the imbalance of power between the two sexes. As feminists we have always known intuitively that the "personal is political." As psychologists, we must begin to make this connection explicit within our theorizing. An analysis of women and men conducted on the group level can be the vehicle by which we integrate the study of the individual with the larger social system. Such an analysis would result in a shift in our usual focus. For example, much theorizing and research about women has been organized around the issues of discrimination and prejudice, especially their negative effects on women. An intergroup perspective recognizes that discrimination and prejudice against members of certain groups are the result of a particular pattern of intergroup relations. Thus, a shift in focus will pull our attention away from studying the victims of prejudice to studying the operation of the intergroup relationship which gives rise to prejudice. This emphasis will certainly help to make our theorizing and research more complete.

In addition, an intergroup perspective will help us to predict changes in individual experiences which will occur as a result of changes in the intergroup relationship.

The idea of analyzing the relationship between the sexes as an intergroup phenomenon is not a new one. In the classic The Second Sex (de Beauvoir, 1952), de Beauvoir explicitly treated the sexes as two groups, with males and females locked together in a relationship involving domination and subordination. For her, this intergroup relationship, which pits the powerful against the powerless, was a "First Cause". In her examination of the second sex, it is the asymmetrical balance of power between women and men which gives rise to the situation in which women have existed throughout history. Though de Beauvoir analyzed numerous individuals and explored the many ways in which individual women have reacted to this imbalance of power, it was always done with an eye toward the intergroup relationship. In her work, the link was continually emphasized between subjectivity and the larger social processes which shape this subjectivity.

Myrdal (1944) also alerted us to the possibility of analyzing the relationship between the sexes on a group level by pointing to the similarities between the perception and treatment of blacks and women in the United States. Using Myrdal's analogy, Hacker (1951) argued that women could be conceived of as a minority group, but one that differs in very special ways from "traditional" minority groups. Obviously, they are not a numerical minority; but, Hacker also argued that women differ because they lack a sense of group identity, and

many do not feel unfairly treated because of their sex. Also, members of "traditional" minority groups (she uses Blacks and Jews as examples) are not compelled to love and live in an intimate way with members of the majority group as women are. These differences are certainly critical ones and a closer look at them by psychologists would probably be fruitful.

In recent years, however, psychology has been characterized by a lack of thinking about women and men on an intergroup level. This may be due to the fact that interest in group processes in general has declined within social psychology. Traditionally, social psychology played a pivotal role in connecting the psychology of the individual with the larger social context. Now, probably due to the influence of cognitive psychology, most social processes are studied at the level of the individual. This individualistic approach has been criticized by Steiner (1974), Moscovici (1972), Tajfel (1972), and Billig (1976). Though these authors offer different views as to why the study of the group has waned, they are unanimous in their assertion that social psychology has suffered as a result.

In this paper, I wish to make up for the lack of attention paid to studying the sexes on an intergroup level. To accomplish this task, I will use Henri Tajfel's recent (1978) theory of intergroup relations as a way to think about men and women on a group level. Because it is crucial to the understanding of Tajfel's theory, it is necessary to discuss first his differentiation between intergroup and interpersonal behavior, and the ways in which this differentiation applies to the relationship between women and men.

### Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Behavior

Interpersonal and intergroup behavior should be conceptualized as two extremes of social behavior. Interpersonal behavior is any interaction between individuals which is fully determined by their interpersonal relationship and the unique blend of their individual characteristics. An interpersonal interaction tends not to be affected by the social groups or categories to which the individuals belong. Intergroup behavior, in contrast, is fully determined by the individuals' memberships in various groups or social categories. It tends not to be affected by the interpersonal relationships of the people involved. (Of course, these terms are to be understood as the definitions of two extremes of behavior; probably neither exists in its pure form in social reality.)

An example of intergroup behavior between males and females would be rape. Indeed, one of the major accomplishments of the modern feminist movement has been to enable people to perceive of the crime as an intergroup phenomenon rather than an interpersonal phenomenon. Historically, rape had been considered as an interpersonal type of interaction. It was believed that the crime was a function of either situational variables ("she was in the wrong place at the wrong time") or dispositional variables ("she is a seductive woman"). Brownmiller (1975) convincingly demonstrated that the old interpersonal explanations could not be wholly supported by the statistics. When rape can literally happen to any woman, (especially during wartime), and few women live without this knowledge, then rape must be seen as an intergroup phenomenon.

Almost any interaction between the sexes where the participants are engaging in highly sex-typed behavior should be viewed as an example of intergroup behavior. In these instances, the behavior is fully determined by the individual's sex group. Appropriately sex-typed behavior functions to keep the two sexes in a highly defined relationship to each other which is predictable, uniform, and supportive of the status quo. Appropriately sex-typed behavior, though it takes place on an individual level, mirrors the relationship that occurs on a group level between the sexes. An example of this reflective quality of sex-typed behavior was provided by Nancy Henley (1977). In her examination of sex differences in non-verbal behavior, she offered empirical evidence that males use more power gestures than females and that, further, these behaviors "underlie and support the macropolitical structure" (p. 179). This macropolitical structure is, of course, the unequal power relation between the sexes. Parlee (1979) came to the same conclusion after examining sex differences in language. It is my belief that much of the behavior that occurs in marriage could be regarded as intergroup behavior, though it is perceived by most people as interpersonal in nature.

Why should there be such concern for specifying whether behavior is intergroup or interpersonal in nature? There are several reasons why this is important. First, the origins of the behavior must be clearly understood. Interpersonal behavior is probably more likely to be controlled by the individual. Intergroup behavior is determined by group membership as well as by the relationship that a particular group has to another group in society. These group factors are often

not under an individual's control. An individual cannot choose her sex or race group, for example. An individual also cannot choose to belong to the sex which is considered superior. Therefore, intergroup behavior may be more restrictive in terms of individual control, even though a person may perceive this behavior as "freely chosen".

Second, if intergroup behavior is a function of the type of relationship that exists between two groups, then efforts to change that relationship which occur on a purely interpersonal level are doomed to failure. What must change is the relationship in society of males as a group to females as a group. This fact should be evident because throughout history, each age has had its share of unique and unconventional women. Yet the efforts of these women to live as freely as they could at the time had no effect on changing the position of women as a group. Feminists have stated this often: "There are no individual solutions."

Are there any examples of purely interpersonal behavior between the sexes? Certainly those behaviors characterized as androgynous (Bem, 1974) would be examples of interpersonal behavior. Also, in a good friendship the behavior tends to be determined by the unique personalities of the individuals involved rather than their sex.

Now that intergroup and interpersonal behavior have been defined, I will turn to a discussion of Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations and I will use this to examine the relationship between the sexes on a group level. Specifically, I will discuss the perceptual and behavioral effects of categorization by sex on intergroup behavior, the effects of the power imbalance between women and men on intergroup

behavior, and the concept of group identity as it relates to women.

#### Categorization, Group Identity, and Social Change

Tajfel's theory of intergroup relations grew out of a series of laboratory experiments conducted by him and his associates over the past decade (Tajfel, et al., 1971; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Turner, 1975). In the initial paradigm, the experimental manipulation, though quite simple, produced interesting results. Subjects were randomly classified as members of two nonoverlapping groups. Next, they were asked to award money to pairs of other subjects. The recipients were anonymous, except for their group membership. For example, each recipient was identified by a number and as belonging to either group X or group Y. Also, the subject was aware of his or her own group membership. The highly reliable finding in this situation was that the mere categorization of people into non-overlapping groups was enough to cause in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group in the decisions about the award money.

These results are so striking because the independent variable is purely cognitive. There was no history of hostility between the groups nor was there any social interaction among the subjects. Apparently, the mere division of people into groups, a relatively simple means of cognitive differentiation, produced effects that have interesting implications for the study of intergroup behavior. Tajfel's conclusion -- that mere categorization into groups is enough to induce in-group favoritism and outgroup hostility -- was supported

by Brewer (1979) in her review of the group literature. (She also concluded that competition, which previously was thought to cause in-group bias, serves to influence the salience of the distinction between the groups.)

Over the past decade, Tajfel and his colleagues have extended the content and range of his intergroup theory considerably (Tajfel, 1978). It is necessary, at this point, to summarize briefly these extensions. The cognitive process of social categorization induces people to make in-group/out-group differentiations based on a particular dimension. These dimensions may be ascribed (sex or race, for example) or achieved (occupational group or campus sorority). This process has perceptual effects in that people tend to minimize differences within a particular group and accentuate any differences between groups. There are behavioral aspects as well in that group members tend to discriminate against the out-group and favor members of their own group. Groups seek to maintain this differentiation of themselves from other groups by emphasizing their distinctiveness on the basis of certain traits. These traits are seen as being connected with group membership and, further, the traits emphasized by the group are those that are particularly valued within the specific cultural context. This latter process is viewed as social comparison on the group level.

It is Tajfel's belief that intergroup social comparison should enhance the group members' social identity. (He conceives of social identity as that part of the self-concept which derives from one's membership in various social groups.) However, if people are members

of groups whose status is low relative to other social groups, then group membership will result in a negative social identity. At this point, Tajfel relates the process of social change to intergroup processes. Social change, in this view, is a process which is initiated by groups who have a negative social identity and who are motivated by the desire to achieve a positive social identity relative to other groups.

Several strategies are available to members of the group with a negative social identity. First, they may try to gain equality with the superior group on certain relevant characteristics. Also, the group may redefine certain negatively valued characteristics. Finally, a third strategy is available to the group which is attempting to achieve a positive social identity. This final option is to create new dimensions of comparison that permit a positive distinctiveness from other groups.

The creation of social change as motivated by these intergroup processes is a rich area to investigate in relation to feminism. Williams and Giles (1978) have written an interesting analysis of the current woman's movement using these ideas. Though these mechanisms of social change will be mentioned later, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine them in any great detail. At this point, I will turn to a discussion of the effects of categorization by sex and the unequal power relations between the sexes.

#### Categorization by Sex: Perceptual and Behavioral Effects

Recall that the mere categorization of people into groups results

in both perceptual and behavioral effects. People tend to perceive group members as highly similar while the differences between the groups are accentuated. Behaviorally, group members will reward members of their own group while discriminating against members of the out-group.

One of the most common categorizations we make is the classification of persons into groups of people who are like us and people who are not like us (Hamilton, 1976). The grouping by sex is probably the primary classification that is made within the human race and this categorization is based on an ascribed rather than an achieved dimension.

Tajfel's theory predicts that people should maximize the differences between the sexes and minimize the similarities. Doise, Deschamps, and Meyer (1978), working with school children and using sex as the basis of categorization, offer evidence to support Tajel's hypothesis regarding intergroup differentiation and within group similarity. Also, the researchers measured the level of differentiations, and, though both boys and girls differentiated between themselves and the members of the opposite sex, boys tended to make sharper differentiations than girls.

Other research has shown that both women and men perceive stereotypically male traits and stereotypically female traits as polar opposites (Rosenkrantz, 1968; Broverman, et al., 1972). Regarding this belief in the existence of psychologically distinct groups based on biological sex, Unger (1979a) has remarked: "It has become increasingly clear in recent years that males and females are most

alike in their perception of their own differences." (p. 20).

Do these differences "really" exist? Since the perceptual effects of categorization are so powerful, Billig (1979) cautioned that any inferences regarding social categories should be based on empirical investigation. Investigators who have reviewed the area of sex difference research in recent years conclude that fewer differences exist than most people believe (MacCoby & Jacklin, 1974; Farris & Offir, 1977).

In relation to the question of group categorization and its tendency to enable people to magnify differences between the sexes, Unger (1979b) has recently questioned the common practice of grouping subjects in psychological experiments according to biological sex.

This is not because questions of sex and gender shouldn't be addressed but, rather, they should be addressed by psychologists in a more sophisticated manner. Categorizing by biological sex alone may obscure important differences between people who may be grouped in other ways when doing sex and gender research. (Kash [1975], for example, has shown that differences in spatial visualization exist only between boys and girls who prefer the sex role appropriate to their own sex. She had grouped her subjects according to sex role preference rather than biological sex.)

The belief that the sexes are "highly" dissimilar is probably reinforced by the segregation of the sexes in most areas of life. This segregation heightens the perception that two distinct groups exist and it also prevents people from grouping along other dimensions. Mintz (1974) notes that the formal recognition that males

and females are separate, distinct groups is made at some level by every institution in society and this belief, in turn, is used to justify the differential treatment of men and women.

Categorization also creates in-group bias and discrimination against the out-group. In the original experimental paradigm, this was demonstrated by the allocation of rewards to members of one's own group. Historically, males have had access to money, power, and other tangible rewards which they have generally distributed amongst a small number of other men. Modern sexism is certainly an example of discrimination in favor of members of the male group. Though Tajfel and his colleagues did not measure directly the negative emotional reactions toward the out-group, it is easy to demonstrate the existence of these feelings on the part of men by pointing to the universal, vigorous and socially sanctioned tradition of misogyny (Russell & Van de Ven, 1976; Tavris & Offir, 1977; Daly, 1978).

The situation with females is quite different. Though the sexes are alike in their beliefs about themselves, they are different when it comes to demonstrating in-group bias and out-group hostility. If we broaden our conception of group bias beyond the experimental situation, and if we consider that bias can be measured behaviorally, cognitively, and affectively, then we have overwhelming evidence that women exhibit a positive bias toward the out-group and a negative bias against their own group. Recent books on the psychology of women (Frieze, et. al., 1979; Unger, 1979a) summarize much empirical evidence demonstrating this fact. For example, both males and females evaluate stereotypically masculine traits as more favorable

(Rosenkrantz, 1968; Broverman, et al., 1972). Women evaluated papers supposedly written by males more positively than those supposedly written by females (Goldberg, 1968). In Chesler's (1976) research with clinic outpatients, women who requested male therapists stated that they had greater respect for a male's competence and authority.

Professions are not considered prestigious if they contain a high proportion of women (Touhey, 1974). In addition, cross-cultural data reveal that the value placed on women's work in general is almost universally lower than the value accorded to men's work. This occurs in spite of the fact that the tasks described as women's work show a great amount of variation across cultures (Rosaldo, 1974). Goldberg (1974), in writing about prejudice against women (by both women and men) concludes that this bias against women as a group is a universal attitude.

This tendency toward anti-female bias even exists among some women who have recently achieved a measure of worldly success. Tajfel's theory predicts that these women should exhibit in-group bias in the distribution of rewards. Though one would expect them to provide younger women in their field with support and opportunity for advancement, this is often not the case. In many instances, these women, nicknamed "queen bees," show little warmth or sympathy for younger women working their way upward (Staines, Tavris, & Jayaratne, 1974). Keiffer and Cullen (1974) have examined the individual reactions of women who deny that difficulties exist for females in terms of career development. Their responses can be placed into two major categories. Either these women claim that membership in a

particular sex group is irrelevant to success, or they attack unsuccessful women as being at fault for their own lack of achievement. Both of these assertions are used extensively by Phyllis Schlafly in her anti-ERA campaign, apparently with the approval of many women as well as men. Both comments show that the blame is placed on individual women while the group level factors which contribute to a lack of success are ignored.

#### Power Differences Between Groups

Of course, the tendency to derogate one's own group and react positively toward the out-group is not unique to women. It is a widespread phenomenon that has been verified by social psychological research into ethnic group relations (Milner, 1975; Giles & Powesland, 1976; Tajfel, 1979). Such diverse groups as the American Blacks, French Canadians, and South African Bantus often display positive attitudes toward the out-group. Obviously, simple categorization into groups cannot account for this behavior, as simple group categorization procedures predict positive in-group bias with a bias against the out-group. What else is happening in the intergroup relationship to produce this effect? Several researchers have suggested that an inequality of power and status between groups can produce the pattern of responding described above (Milner, 1975; Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978; Apfelbaum, 1979; Tajfel, 1979).

For example, Moscovici & Paicheler (1978) and Apfelbaum (1979) cite experimental evidence which extends Tajfel's original experimental paradigm. In this research, besides being categorized

into groups, the subjects were led also to believe that they were either in a majority or a minority group. Thus, the subject was situated in a "heterogeneous and unequal relation with the other group" (Apfelbaum, 1979, p. 195). The results showed that many of the minority subjects favored the subjects of the majority group even though it was detrimental to their own group. In a related experiment, Doise (cited in Moscovici & Paicheler, 1978), demonstrated that a group with an insecure image of itself also had the tendency to favor the superior group.

Thus, this direct experimental evidence complements observations made outside the laboratory and shows that an asymmetrical balance of power between groups affects both the functioning within groups as well as the functioning between groups. Notice also that the variable of interest here is a group level variable. The unequal power and status between groups helps to determine the individual responses within groups. Apfelbaum (1979) concludes that unequal power between groups tends to strengthen the bonds among people in the dominant group and it tends to weaken the support among people in the subordinate group.

It should be noticed that to explain these effects by searching for causes "within" the individual would obscure the operation of the group level variables. In thinking about research relating to women and men, this has been the fate of much sex difference research. Researchers studying the differences in behavior between the sexes have often conceptualized biological sex as an independent variable. At the same time, the social meaning of the categories male and female

(i.e., dominant and subordinate) has been ignored as a causal mechanism. Unger (1979a) is correct in stating that in the study of sex differences, biological sex has been confounded with power and status.

Now, to return to the original point, many sex linked differences in behavior are a function of the intergroup relationship between women and men. To use one example, the evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that women have tendencies to derogate themselves. An intergroup analysis suggests that women's tendencies to dislike themselves are a function of their membership in a subordinate group. To change this attitude requires a change in the power relations between these groups. This critical point is often ignored by psychologists.

The sex role explanation of change is one example of an approach that overlooks some important factors operating on an intergroup level. In this analysis, relations among women and between the sexes would change if girls were socialized to be more achievement-oriented and boys were socialized to be more expressive. However, if the unequal power relations between the sexes are not addressed as a major issue, this will merely result in expressive, dominant males and achievement-oriented, subordinate females.

Certainly the sex role prescription for change is comforting and I can understand why it is so appealing. In this view, "socialization" is seen to be the cause of women's lack of power as a group and social change is reduced to efforts made on an individual level. The need for solidarity on a group basis need never be

addressed as an issue.

The alternative to changing sex roles is for the subordinate group to challenge the dominant group regarding their claims to power and status, and this is to provoke open conflict (Tajfel, 1979). Since the definition of power implies a relative ranking of two groups, a refusal by either group to participate in this reciprocal relationship causes a disruption in the system. Probably both sexes suffer from the disruption, but women potentially have more to gain. To continue, conflict occurs because men realize that if the other sex refuses to define itself as subordinate, males can no longer achieve a positive group identity when group differentiation occurs based on sex. And, since categorization based on sex is such a basic form of group differentiation, the disruption in intergroup relations is felt not only in the work place, but in one's intimate relationships as well (Bernard, 1981).

In an intriguing passage, Stoltenberg (1974) presents a very clear differentiation between the sex role approach and the intergroup approach to the relationship between the sexes. In his view, notice that "masculinity" becomes an intergroup construct rather than the enactment of a specific role:

"Masculinity is not, as some have said, a vague set of 'qualities' (such as 'ambition,' 'strength,' 'courage', or 'competitiveness'). Nor is masculinity an abstract 'role,' which can be 'played' or 'not played,' or which any two people can take turns at. What is denoted by the word masculinity derives from the objective reality, the fact of

our lives under patriarchy, that all members of the gender class of males are entitled to obtain their sense of self by postulating the selflessness of the gender class of women, their sense of worth by asserting female worthlessness, and their power in the culture by maintaining the powerlessness of women. Masculinity is that sense of self, that sense of worth, that right to power which accrues to every male on account of the global subjugation of women."

#### The Concept of Group Identity

The above passage, besides defining the concept of masculinity, also directs our attention to the fact that power and a positive group identity seem to be closely identified and they seem to operate within a closed system. Groups who have power are at a clear advantage in both creating and maintaining a positive group identity. Recall that all groups are motivated to achieve a positive group identity and that in order to achieve this, a group will emphasize its distinctiveness from other groups on traits that are positively valued within the cultural context. Within any culture, it is the group with power that constructs the prevailing value system for both the dominant and subordinate groups. Also, the powerful group is not only capable of defining itself, but it also defines the subordinate group (Apfelbaum, 1979) because it has the means to do so. By controlling the information that is disseminated within the culture (Wirsig, 1973), the dominant group can offer a view of reality which asserts its "right" to be dominant. It presents itself as the embodiment of all

those positive traits that exist within the prevailing value system.

A complete circle is created when it is realized that the dominant group created the value system by which it judges itself and other groups. (A closed feedback loop, rather than a linear cause and effect relationship, best describes this process.)

Keeping the above comments in mind, let us return to the situation between women and men. Historically, males have been the dominant sex group. They have always had access to and control over the major institutions that shape our view of reality (Rich, 1979). To insure a positive group identity based on their sex and as a result of categorization by sex, men have incorporated anti-female bias into these major institutions: Law (DeCrow, 1974); Religion (Daly, 1972); and Science (Ehrenreich & English, 1978).

More recently, the social sciences have also been criticized for defining women exclusively in terms of men (Westcott, 1979). Within psychology especially there has been a tendency to accept the view that biological factors were largely the cause of the power imbalance between the sexes (Williams & Giles, 1978). Using biological factors to explain the socially created differences between the sexes enables men and women to believe that the existing social reality is both immutable and natural.

For centuries women have accepted their subordinate situation as both inevitable and legitimate. Therefore, they tended not to compare themselves with males. (It may not be too extreme to suggest that historically this type of comparison would have been as unthinkable to women as was the comparison of humans to other primates prior to

Darwin.)

In the absence of intergroup social comparison, the search for a positive social identity drops to the individual level. Tajfel (1978) suggests that in this instance group members will compare themselves with each other. Williams and Giles (1978) conclude that the result of this intragroup social comparison among women is the motivation to act individualistically rather than in terms of the group. This self-oriented behavior tends to deter any unified social action which would change the status quo and it also prompts competition between women.

The challenge to the imbalance of power between the sexes only began to occur when women as a group started to compare themselves with men and conclude that their subordinate status was unfair and illegitimate. They no longer viewed their status as inevitable and biologically fixed. It would be interesting to know what triggered this radical cognitive shift in the comparison process. Though Williams and Giles (1978) attempt to address this issue regarding feminism in the 1960's they offer data that is inconclusive. Unfortunately, Tajfel's theory does not offer any clues to help explain what brings about this shift and the final answer may lie with the historians. There is, however, one point that should be apparent. The intergroup theory assumes that the struggle to achieve a positive group identity on the part of subordinate groups is preceded by the refusal of the subordinate group to accept the dominant group's view of reality.

Once the subordinate group refuses to accept its negative social

identity as legitimate, several strategies are available to help the group achieve a positive social identity. First, the subordinate group may try to gain equality with the superior group on certain relevant characteristics. For example, the demand for the passage of the ERA is an attempt on the part of women to gain equality with men in the eyes of the law.

A second strategy is the redefining of certain negatively valued characteristics. Women are believed to be emotionally expressive, a trait which is not as highly valued as the goal-oriented competency that is believed to characterize men (Rosenkrantz, 1968). Over the past decade, people have been re-evaluating the role of emotional expressivity and are beginning to think about it as a positive, rather than a negative, trait (David & Brannon, 1976).

Finally, a third strategy is available to the group which is attempting to achieve a positive social identity. This final option is to create new dimensions of comparison that permit a positive distinctiveness from other groups. To achieve this end, women may emphasize that, unlike men, they do not favor depersonalized sex. Nor do they solve conflicts through the use of aggression.

To review, then, at least two events are critical in the movement to change the power imbalance between the sexes. First, women must reject their position as an inferior group based on the unchangeable fact of their biological sex. (Of course, implicit in this rejection is the refusal to participate in the system which insures a positive group identity for males which is based only on their biological sex). Second, women must begin to offer their own interpretations of

reality. In doing this, they will accomplish a genuinely radical act: they will create their own group identity instead of assuming an identity which was not of their making. Certainly a feminist psychology plays an important role in both these processes.

### Conclusion

My purpose in writing this paper was to stimulate others to think about the relations between men and women on an intergroup level. I think that we can gain new insights in our theorizing by using some of the constructs I've described. I hope that this paper will provoke more questions than it has answered. The significant issues to be addressed in this area have both psychological and political relevance. I will list a few of those that have occurred to me as a stimulation to further work:

1. Some writers (Hacker, 1951; Cheshire, 1972; Apfelbaum, 1979) believe that women lack any sense of group identity based on sex. Certainly a good case can be made for this point of view. If this is so, we are further behind than we might think. Research in this area would help to resolve this issue.
2. Evidence indicates that children's play patterns contain clear sex differences (Lever, 1976). One specific difference is this: boys play in large and age-heterogeneous groups more often than girls who tend to play in primarily dyadic

relationships. The play in boys' groups tends to become very complex with age including the extended use of "legal systems" to solve conflicts that arise during play. I suspect that this sex difference has implications for the development and maintenance of a group identity based on sex. This area should be investigated in more detail with specific reference to intergroup relations.

3. All humans belong to many social groups. Most of these groups contain individuals who are alike on one dimension (race, family), but different on another dimension (sex). What is the effect of these crossed category memberships (e.g., white, female vs. black, female)?

## Reference Note

1. Stoltenberg, J. Toward gender justice. Paper presented at a conference of the Gay Academic Union, November 29, 1974.

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